

THE EXISTENCE OR NONEXISTENCE
OF THE MIND OF BUDDHA:
A DEBATE BETWEEN *FAXINGZONG* AND *FAXIANGZONG*
IN CHENGGUAN'S INTERPRETATION*

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One passage of the *Sūtra Manifestation of the Tathāgata* is studied in this article. The central question of this passage is whether the *Tathāgata* has mental activity like ordinary people. The exegetes of medieval China recognised the ambiguity of Indian Buddhist tradition on this topic. These monks attempted to harmonise the different views under the rubric of perfect teaching, i.e. the *Huayan* teaching. This article includes a translation of Chengguan's commentary on this passage, as it is not only the most elaborate explanation of the text, but also a good example of how Chinese commentators interpreted scriptural sources.

Key words: *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, *Tathāgata*, mental activity, Chengguan, commentary.

The *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, one of the largest *Mahāyāna sūtras*, consists of numerous chapters that treat the teachings of emptiness, *upāya*, the *bodhisattva* career and other major *Mahāyāna* tenets. Some of these chapters were circulated independently before the compilation of this collection of *sūtras* as attested by their early Chinese translations. The most famous *sūtras* are undoubtedly the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* and the *Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra*.¹ Although the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* has been preserved only in Chinese and Tibetan translations,² the Sanskrit originals of these two works are extant.³

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¹ For a study of *Gaṇḍavyūha*, see Gómez (1967). The chief protagonist of this work is a boy called Sudhana who meets spiritual friends (*kalyāṇamitra*) along the way in his search for enlightenment. This story was often depicted in Asian Art. See Fontein (1967). Recently, paintings of Sudhana's journey along with the inscription of the Tibetan text were discovered in the temple of Ta Pho. See Steinkellner (1995, 1999).

² The first complete Chinese translation of the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* was done by Buddhaghosa in 420. It consists of 60 fascicles and thus came to be known as the 60-fascicle *Huayanjing* (T 9, 278). Next, Śikṣānanda rendered it into Chinese in 699. This is the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing* (T 10, 279). The third translation, the 40-fascicle *Huayanjing*, actually only contains the last chap-

As Takasaki Jikidō pointed out, another remarkable part of this collection is the *sūtra* entitled *Manifestation of the Tathāgata*. He regards it as a precursor of the *Tathāgatagarbha* theory, as the *sūtra* says that all beings are endowed with the wisdom of *Tathāgata* but due to their ignorance, delusion and grasping they cannot realise it. The reason why Buddha appeared in the world is to teach living beings in order to enable them to realise their inner potencies.⁴ On the basis of the Tibetan translation he reconstructed the Sanskrit title as *Tathāgata-utpatti-sambhava-nirdeśa Sūtra*.⁵ Today we have five versions of this work, four in Chinese, one in Tibetan:

1. *Fo shuo rulai xingxian jing* 佛說如來興顯經 (T 10, 291: 592a1–617b7)
2. *Baowang rulai xingqi pin* 寶王如來性起品 (T 9, 278: 611b1–631b5)⁶
3. *Rulai chuxian pin* 如來出現品 (T 10, 279: 262a15–278c22)

ter, the *Gaṇḍavyūha* (T 10, 293). The Tibetan translation was done by Jinamitra in the ninth century. Its title is *Sangs-rgyas phal-po-che zhes bya-ba shin-tu rgyas-pa chen-pa'i mdo* (Peking 761). The Sanskrit originals of the 60- and 80-fascicle *Huayanjing* were brought from Khotan. This shows that this *sūtra* gained wide currency in this region. That the Sanskrit manuscript existed is attested by Zhiyan: he confirms it as well as describing the manuscript (T 45, 1870: 588a13–589c17). Collating the chapters of the 60-fascicle *Huayanjing*, the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing*, the Tibetan translation and the alleged Sanskrit original revealed several differences. The numbers and the titles of the chapters are different because certain chapters are missing from some of the versions, and the divisions of the texts into chapters are different. For example, the eleventh and thirty-second chapters of the Tibetan version are not found in any other versions. Moreover, the second chapter of the 60-fascicle *Huayanjing*, the *Buddha Vairocana*, is divided into five separate chapters in the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing*. Sometimes the same chapters have various titles in other versions. This reveals how the text of the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* evolved through the ages. The last stage of it, at least according to the extant versions, is the Tibetan version which is the largest of all versions. For a comparative study of the various versions, see Kimura (1992, pp. 4–10). For a German translation of the 60-fascicle *Huayanjing*, see Doi (1978, 1981, 1982). For a Japanese translation, see Etō (1917). For an English translation of the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing*, see Cleary (1993). For a Japanese translation, see Etō (1929, 1959). For a summary of each chapter of the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing*, see Cleary (1983, pp. 171–205).

³ For the bibliographical information of the editions of these Sanskrit texts, see Nakamura (1980, pp. 195–196).

⁴ For Takasaki's discussion of this *sūtra* from the aspect of the development of *Tathāgatagarbha* theory, see Takasaki (1974, pp. 574–602). For a recent summary, see Zimmermann (2002, pp. 11–93).

⁵ See Takasaki (1958). Although the Sanskrit title has not survived, the text's famous metaphor of the big book that is as big as the world and describes the whole world but can enter one particle of an atom is cited by the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. See Takasaki (1966, pp. 189–192). For an analysis of the title, see Itō (1967).

⁶ For a detailed study of this version, see Kaginushi (1972a). The Chinese exegetes of the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing*, Huiyuan and Chengguan, remarked that the word *xing* in the title had been added by the translator. See XZJ 5: 519b16–18, T 35, 1735: 872a11–12. According to the Tibetan translation of the *sūtra*, *utpatti* (*skye-ba*), or *sambhava* (*'byung-ba*), or combinations of them, were rendered as *xingqi* by the translator. See Takasaki (1960, pp. 282–289). Nonetheless, one major tenet of *Huayan* Buddhism, nature-origination, took its name from this title. This reveals how the absolute becomes manifested in the phenomenal world. For studies of this important teaching, see Kamata (1957, 1965, pp. 565–574), Endō (1965, 1966, 1967), Kaginushi (1972b, 1986), Gimello (1976, pp. 442–445), Yoshizu (1983b), Nakajō (1988), Chung (1991), and Gregory (1991, pp. 187–192, 242–243).

4. *Dafangguang rulai xingqi weimizang jing* 大方廣如來性起微密藏經 (Kimura 1999)
5. *De-bzhin-gshegs-pa skye-ba 'byung-ba* (Peking 761: 75b2–142b4)

The first is the earliest Chinese translation done by Dharmarakṣa between 265 and 289. This early translation clearly shows that it is an early *Mahāyāna sūtra*, and had existed independently before it came to be a chapter in the *Avatamsaka Sūtra*.⁷ The second and third renditions are included in the 60- and 80-fascicle *Huayanjing*, respectively. The fourth version has been lost in China but was found in Japan among the manuscripts discovered recently in the Nanatsudera temple of Nagoya.⁸ However, this text seems to be a version of the *Baowang rulai xingqipin* as it is very similar to it, but contains several errors, probably due to unreliable copying.⁹ This demonstrates the popularity of this *sūtra* because it was taken out of the *Huayanjing* and was circulated independently. The fifth version is a chapter from the Tibetan translation of the *Avatamsaka Sūtra*.¹⁰

At the beginning of the *sūtra*, Buddha appears as emitting light that illuminates all the worlds and extinguishes the suffering of all beings. Finally, the light enters the head of the *bodhisattva* Wondrous Quality of the Origination of *Tathāgata*-nature. Inspired by the light of the Buddha the *bodhisattva* asks who is able to reveal Buddha's teaching. Then Buddha emits light from his mouth again which arrives at the mouth of *bodhisattva* Samantabhadra. In reply to the question of *bodhisattva* Wondrous Quality of the Origination of *Tathāgata*-nature, he relates that Buddha shows this kind of transformation before declaring the teaching of the manifestation of *Tathāgata*. Next, *bodhisattva* Wondrous Quality of the Origination of *Tathāgata*-nature poses ten questions, to which Samantabhadra replies in the remaining part of the *sūtra*. These ten topics are as follows: 1. the characteristics of the manifestation of *Tathāgata*; 2. the body of *Tathāgata*; 3. the voice of *Tathāgata*; 4. the mind of *Tathāgata*; 5. the realm of *Tathāgata*; 6. the deeds of *Tathāgata*; 7. the perfect enlightenment of *Tathāgata*; 8. the turning of the *Dharma* wheel by *Tathāgata*; 9. the *pari-*

⁷ Kawano Satoshi collated this version with the Tibetan translation, and concluded that it has several interpolations that are due partly to the impact of Dark Learning (*xuanxue* 玄學) and partly to the inclusion of Dharmarakṣa's own commentaries on the text. See Kawano (1995). Kagawa Takao showed that due to the early production of this version, the theory that all living beings are endowed with *Tathāgatajñāna* is not as well formulated as in the other later versions. See Kagawa (1967). For Dharmarakṣa's method of translation, see Boucher (1996) and Karashima (1998).

⁸ For a report on this discovery, see Ochiai (1991). For pictures and an edition of the text, see Kimura (1999).

⁹ The first Chinese source that records the existence of this *sūtra* is the *Lidai sanbao ji* 歷代三寶記 written by Fei Changfang 費長房 in 597. See T 49, 2034: 68a22. According to this, it was translated during the Yuankang 元康 period (291–299) of Western Jin, and its translator is unknown (68b1–2). Prior to the discovery of the manuscript in Nanatsudera, Kaginushi Ryōkei had demonstrated that this translation cannot antedate the 60-fascicle *Huayanjing*. See Kaginushi (1973, 1974). His hypothesis was substantiated by the manuscript.

¹⁰ I have been working on the critical edition of the Tibetan text, collating the following versions: Peking, Phug-brag, Narthang, Lithang, Derge, Lhasa, Stog Palace, London, and Tokyo.

nirvāṇa of *Tathāgata*; 10. the merits originated from seeing, hearing and being associated with *Tathāgata*.¹¹

The passage we will study here is found at the beginning of the fourth topic where the mind of *Tathāgata* is described.

1. 佛言。何謂佛子。而諸菩薩。遊入如來至真等正覺心所念行。如來不爲心有所念。不分別名。不曉了識。如來無心。乃能入遊無量之念。(T 10, 291: 605a15–18)

Buddha said: “Sons of Buddha, how can the *bodhisattva* enter the [realm of] mental activity of *Tathāgata*, *Arhat* and the completely enlightened being? The *Tathāgata* cannot be a thought of mind, neither a name that is discriminated, and neither a consciousness that [one] can be aware of. Only if [the *bodhisattva* understands that] *Tathāgata* has no mind, can he enter [the realm of] infinite thought.”

2. 佛子。云何菩薩摩訶薩。知見如來應供等正覺心。此菩薩摩訶薩。知心意識非即如來。但知如來智無量故。心亦無量。(T 9, 278: 622b12–14)

Son of Buddha, how should the *bodhisattva mahāsattvas* know and see the mind of *Tathāgata*, *Arhat* and the completely enlightened being? Sons of Buddha, the *bodhisattva mahāsattvas* know that *Tathāgata* cannot be defined by mind (*citta*), thought (*manas*) and consciousness (*vi-jñāna*). However, they know that as the wisdom of *Tathāgata* is infinite, his mind is also infinite.¹²

3. 佛子。諸菩薩摩訶薩。應云何知如來應正等覺心。佛子。如來心意識。俱不可得。但應以智無量故。知如來心。(T 10, 279: 271a23–25)

¹¹ The presumably earliest *Mahāyāna sūtras* preserved, the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras* emphasised the *śūnyatā* of *Tathāgata*. A major shift in the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* is the development of the soteriological aspect of *Tathāgata*. This is to say that the *Tathāgata* appeared in the world in order to liberate all living beings. See Guang (2002, pp. 132–136). For a study of the description of *Tathāgata* in this *sūtra*, see Kawanabe (1976). Itō Zui’ei investigates this *sūtra* in connection with the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*. The former *sūtra* explains the realisation of *Tathāgata-jñāna-guṇa* from the aspect of fruition, while the latter one teaches the realisation of *Tathāgata-jñāna-guṇa* from the aspect of *bodhisattva* deeds as cause. See Itō (1988, pp. 966–987).

¹² Torakazu Doi translates this passage as follows: “Liebe Söhne Buddhas! Auf welche Weise schaut und begreift der Bodhisattva den Geist des heiligen Buddha, des „Erhellten“, des „Unvergleichlichen“? Der Bodhisattva begreift daß der Geist des urteilenden Verstandes nicht einfach der Geist Buddhas ist. Nur darum, weil er begreift, daß die Weisheit Buddhas unermesslich ist, begreift er auch, daß der Geist Buddhas unermesslich ist.” See Doi (1982, p. 158). Etō Sokuō’s Japanese translation is as follows: “佛子よ、云何が菩薩摩訶薩は、如来应供等正觉の心を見せん。此の菩薩摩訶薩は、心意識は即ち如来に非ざることを知る。但如来の智は無量なるが故に、心も亦無量なりと知る。” See Etō (1917, vol. 5, p. 514).

Son of Buddha, how should the *bodhisattva mahāsattvas* know the minds of *Tathāgatas*, *Arhats* and the completely enlightened being? Sons of Buddha, the mind (*citta*), thought (*manas*) and consciousness (*viññāna*) of *Tathāgata* cannot be grasped, but given his infinite wisdom the mind of *Tathāgata* should be known.¹³

4. 佛子。云何菩薩摩訶薩。知見如來應供等正覺心。此菩薩摩訶薩。知心意識非即如來。但知 □□□□。(Kimura 1999, p. 617.)

Son of Buddha, how should the *bodhisattva mahāsattvas* know and see the mind of *Tathāgata*, *Arhat* and the completely enlightened being? Sons of Buddha, the *bodhisattva mahāsattvas* know that *Tathāgata* cannot be defined by mind, thought and consciousness. However, they know...

5. byang-chub sems-dpa' sems-dpa' chen-po de-bzhin gshegs-pa'i rigs-su byung-ba'i dpal-gyis byang-chub sems-dpa' sems-dpa' chen-po kun-tu bzang-po-la 'di skad ces smras-so / kye rgyal-ba'i sras byang-chub sems-dpa' sems-dpa' chen-pos / ji-lta-bur de-bzhin gshegs-pa dgra-bcom-pa yang-dag-par rdzogs-pa'i sangs-rgyas-rnams-kyi thugs skye-ba khong-du chud-par bya / de skad ces smras-pa dang byang-chub sems-dpa' sems-dpa' chen-po kun-tu bzang-pos / byang-chub sems-dpa' sems-dpa' chen-po de-bzhin gshegs-pa'i rigs-su byung ba'i dpal-la 'di skad ces smras so / kye rgyal-ba'i sras de-bzhin gshegs-pa-rnams ni sems-kyis rnam-par dgod-pa ma yin / yid-kyis rnam-par dgod-pa ma yin rnam-par shes-pas rnam-par dgod-pa ma yin-te / kye rgyal-ba'i sras de-bzhin gshegs-pa'i thugs skye-ba ni / de-bzhin gshegs-pa'i ye-shes tshad-med-pas khong-du chud-par bya'o / (Peking 761: 111a3-7.)¹⁴

The *bodhisattva mahāsattva* Wondrous Quality of Being Born in the Family of *Tathāgata* told *bodhisattva mahāsattva* Samantabhadra: “Son of Buddha, how should the *bodhisattva mahāsattvas* know the origination of the mind of *Tathāgata*, *Arhat* and the completely enlightened being?” After saying this *bodhisattva mahāsattva* Samantabhadra

¹³ Cleary's translation: “How should great enlightening beings know the mind of Buddha and truly awake? The mind, intellect, and consciousness of Buddha are ungraspable. One can know the mind of Buddha only in terms of infinity of knowledge.” Cleary (1993, p. 998). Cheng Chien's translation: “Children of the Buddha, how should all Bodhisattva-mahāsattvas know the mind of the Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Enlightened One? Children of the Buddha, the mind, thought, and consciousness of the Tathāgata are unobtainable (anupalabhya). It should be known that only because wisdom is boundless that one can know the mind of Tathāgata.” See Chien (1993, pp. 97-98). Etō Sokuō's Japanese translation: “佛子よ、諸菩薩摩訶薩は、応に云何んが如来応正等覺の心を知るべきや。佛子よ、如来の心意識は俱に不可得なり、但応に智の無量なるを以ての故に、如来の心を知るべし。” See Etō (1959, p. 89).

¹⁴ For different editions, see Narthang: 157b1-6, Stog: 147a4-147b1, Derge: 110b1-4, Tokyo: 141a6-141b3, Lithang: 119a6-119b3, Lhasa: 152b1-6, London: 112b4-8.

told *bodhisattva mahāsattva* Wondrous Quality of Being Born in the Family of *Tathāgata*: “Sons of Buddha, the *Tathāgatas* cannot be established by means of mind, thought or consciousness. The origination of the mind of *Tathāgata* should be known as the infinite wisdom of *Tathāgata*.”¹⁵

The question here is how the *bodhisattvas* should understand the mind of Buddha. It is stated in various scriptures that the wisdom or awareness (*jñāna*) of Buddha does not resemble any kind of mental activity. However, it is also stated that his wisdom is different from the state of cessation of sensation and conceptualisation (*saṃjñāveditanirodha*), and belongs to the categories of mind and mental associates (*citta-caitta*). The only way to resolve this contradiction is to say that his wisdom is different from all other mental activities to such an extent that its being a mental activity can be denied (see Griffith 1994, pp. 153–158). Thus *The Manifestation of the Tathāgata* says that Buddha does not have the discriminating mind that can be called *citta*, *manas* or *vijñāna*,¹⁶ but his mental activity, his production of intention (see Edgerton 1953, p. 229) (*thugs skye-ba*, *cittotpāda*) can be depicted in terms of his infinite wisdom (*jñāna*). This is a crucial issue as Buddha is described as having appeared in the world with the intention of teaching living beings. However, in accordance with the explanation of the *sūtra*, this intention cannot be classified as a kind of mental activity, but rather it should be attributed to the infinite wisdom of Buddha.

It is interesting to note that only Dharmarakṣa’s early translation has an equivalence for the Tibetan term *thugs skye-ba*, which is *xinsuo nianxing* 心所念行, while in the 60- and 80-fascicle *Huayanjing* only *xin* can be found. Moreover, the ambiguity regarding the mental activity of Buddha discussed above seems to haunt in the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing* when it says, “the mind, thought and consciousness of *Tathāgata* cannot be grasped” 如來心意識。俱不可得。Is this to say that the mind of *Tathāgata* cannot be grasped because it does not exist, or because his mind is quite different from the ordinary deluded mind? This question was raised by the Chinese commentator of the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing*, the renowned fourth patriarch of the *Huayan* lineage, Chengguan 澄觀 (738–839).¹⁷

¹⁵ Takasaki Jikidō’s Japanese translation of the Tibetan version is as follows: 偉大なる如来性起妙徳菩薩は、偉大なる普現菩薩に向かい、次のように質問した。「ジナの子よ、菩薩大士は、正しく完全なさとりをひらいた世の尊敬をうけるに値する如来たちの心の生起を、どのように理解すべきであろうか」かく言われて、偉大なる普現菩薩は、偉大なる如来性起妙徳菩薩に向かい、次のように述べた。ジナの子よ、如来たちは、心によっても想定されず、意によっても想定されず、認識によっても想定されない。ジナの子よ、如来の心の生起は、無量なる如来の知恵をもって理解されるべきである。See Takasaki (1981, p. 210).

¹⁶ Here, the three words *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* are synonyms and do not seem to possess the separate meanings later attributed to them by *Yogācāra* authors. For the different definitions of these terms in *Hīnayāna* and *Yogācāra*, see Nakamura (1975, pp. 762–763).

¹⁷ For Chengguan’s biography, see Hamar (2002a); for various aspects of his philosophy, see Hamar (1998a, 1998b, 1999).

Before turning to Chengguan's interpretation, first we study how other *Huayan* masters preceding Chengguan explained this passage.¹⁸ Fazang 法藏 (643–712), the third patriarch, in his commentary on the 60-fascicle *Huayanjing*, *Huayanjing tanxuanji* 華嚴經探玄記 (T 35, 1733), explains this passage under the rubric of five teachings.¹⁹ According to the elementary teaching of *Mahāyāna*, that is the *Faxiangzong*, the *Yogācāra* teachings introduced by Xuanzang, the *Tathāgata* has eight pure consciousnesses, and thus on this level the existence of his mental activity is confirmed. On the level of the final teaching of *Mahāyāna* this is rejected with the statement that only his wisdom exists. The sudden teaching states that at the level of Buddhahood the great wisdom is inherently identical with the real nature because its illumination is identical with the quiescent nature of all things 佛地大智內同真性, 以照即寂故. The perfect teaching includes the previous three explanations without obstruction, emphasising the identity of principle and wisdom, as well as the identity of the king, i.e. mind and the subordinate, i.e. wisdom.

Fazang commenced to write a commentary on the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing* but was unable to finish it; the task of completing it thus fell to his disciple Huiyuan 慧苑. This work is entitled *Xu huayanjing lüeshu kandingji* 續華嚴經略疏刊定記 (XZJ 5). Although Huiyuan leaves out the categories of five teachings, he also discusses four different interpretations of the passage (see XZJ 5: 530a10–b13). According to the first explanation, neither the mind nor *dharmas* of the *Tathāgata* are defiled; the mind and *dharmas* with which he is endowed are pure. On this undefiled level wisdom is strong and consciousness is weak (*zhiqiang shilie* 智強識劣). If there were no king, i.e. mind, what would the supported (*suoyi* 所依), i.e. wisdom rely on? In the second explanation, Buddha is said to have no mind because he does not discriminate. Still, he has a kind of mind (*xin zhonglei* 心種類), because his mind is the cause of the attained stage of Buddhahood due to “perfuming” (*vāsanā*). According to the third view, the *Tathāgata* actually does not have a mind or any mental *dharmas*, as he possesses only wisdom. The fourth position points out that both the existence and nonexistence of the mind of Buddha are right and wrong in some respects. In terms of the nonexistence of the defiled aspect (*ranfen* 染分) he has no mind, and in terms of the existence of the pure aspect (*jingfen* 淨分) he has a mind. However, if we clung to the nonexistence of his mind it would lead to the nonexist-

¹⁸ We will study the commentaries of Fazang and Huiyuan, though the second patriarch Zhiyan 智儼 (602–668) and the hermit Li Tongxuan 李通玄 (635–730) also wrote commentaries on the *Avatamsaka Sūtra*. However, Zhiyan's commentary *Dafangguang huayanjing souxuan fenqi tongzhi fanggui* 大方廣華嚴經搜玄分齊通智方軌 (T 33, 1732), except the introductory part, contains only the outline of the text, while Li Tongxuan's commentary *Xin huayanjing lun* 新華嚴經論 (T 33, 1739) is not a word-for-word exegetical work but rather focuses on the general meaning of the chapters.

¹⁹ See *Dafangguang fo huayan jing tanxuanji huiben* 大方廣佛華嚴經探玄記會本 (1134; T 35, 1733: 410b19–c11). For a thorough treatment of the development of doctrinal classification in *Huayan* tradition, see Gregory (1991, pp. 115–153). Francis H. Cook studied and translated Fazang's most important work related to the five teachings, *Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqizhang* 華嚴一乘教義分齊章 (T 45, 1866). See Cook (1970).

ence of his form and voice, and if we cling to the existence of his mind it would lead to the defiled nature of his mind. Huiyuan does not provide an account of sudden teaching, but instead he inserts a new interpretation as the second level. However, the first, third and fourth interpretations correspond to the elementary, final and perfect teachings propounded by Fazang, respectively.

Chengguan is definitely indebted to both Fazang and Huiyuan in his interpretation of the passage. He also explained the text from the aspect of different philosophical views but unlike Fazang he did not apply the system of five teachings but introduced two categories, the *Faxiangzong* and *Faxingzong*. The *Faxiangzong* 法相宗, the lineage of *dharma*-characteristics (*dharma-lakṣaṇa*), refers to the *Yogācāra* teachings that were brought from India to China by the famous Chinese pilgrim, Xuanzang 玄奘 (600–664). It was Fazang who provided this pejorative name implying that this school is preoccupied with the characteristics of *dharma*s and is thus a quasi-*Hīnayāna* school (see Yoshizu 1983a). The other category, *Faxingzong* 法性宗, the lineage of *dharma*-nature (*dharma-tā*), is regarded as an invention of Fazang, too, and understood as the Chinese school of *Yogācāra*.²⁰ In fact, it was not Fazang but Chengguan who invented and construed this term, and it would be difficult to substantiate that it covers only *Yogācāra* teachings as it includes *Madhyamaka* elements as well.²¹

In addition to introducing these terms, he expanded the scope of the discussion by setting up a polemic framework. His commentary on this passage thus came to be a short essay that is worth studying in its own right. At the first step, he gives an account of *Faxiangzong* and *Faxingzong/Wuxiangzong* 無相宗 providing the reason and scriptural evidences with which they prove their theses. Two masters of *Faxiangzong* state that Buddha in fact has mental activity. The first master argues that the mind and mental associates with which Buddha is endowed are pure, and we know that he must have a mind as wisdom evolves by relying on consciousness. The second master says that eight consciousnesses are found at the level of Buddhahood, but they are associated with four kinds of wisdom; the *ālayavijñāna* thus does not accumulate *karma*, the *manas* does not regard *ālayavijñāna* as an ego, and the first six consciousnesses do not discriminate objects. In conclusion, Buddha has the essence of a mind but does not possess its function. In contrast with the opinions of masters of *Faxiangzong*, the *Faxingzong/Wuxiangzong* state that *Tathāgata* does not

²⁰ For this view, see Lusthaus (2002, p. 372) and Lai (1986).

²¹ Chengguan found ten differences between *Faxingzong* and *Faxiangzong*: 1. one vehicle or three vehicles 一乘三乘; 2. one nature or five natures (i.e. *gotras*) 一性五性; 3. consciousness only is real or false 唯心真妄; 4. the *Tathatā* is dependent-arising or is immovable 真如隨緣凝然; 5. the emptiness and existence of three natures are identical or different 三性空有即離; 6. [the number of] living beings and buddhas is not increasing or not decreasing 生佛不增不減; 7. the emptiness and existence of two truths are identical or different 二諦空有即離; 8. the four characteristics are simultaneous or successive 四相一時前後; 9. the subject and the object of enlightenment are identical or different 能所斷證即離; 10. the body of Buddha is conditioned or unconditioned 佛身無為有為. See T 35, 1735: 511a2–6. For a detailed explanation of the origin of the term *Faxingzong* and the ten differences, see my forthcoming article on this topic.

have a mind as on the level of *dharmakāya* only Suchness and the wisdom of Suchness exist.

Next, he interprets the tenets of *Faxiangzong* and *Faxingzong/Wuxiangzong* from the aspect of *Huayan* Buddhism. First, he demonstrates that neither of these two views can be correct as they are in contradiction to the doctrine and text itself. The doctrine referred to is that the dharmas are both existent and nonexistent, a tenet that Chengguan adopted from the *Cheng weishi lun*. Both lineages are one-sided as they either emphasise existence or nonexistence. In addition, they fail to conform to the text of the *sūtra*. If the mind of *Tathāgata* were existent, then why does the *sūtra* say, “his mind cannot be grasped”? If it were nonexistent why does it say, “given his infinite wisdom the mind of *Tathāgata* should be known”? Moreover, Chengguan also stresses that it is not valid to say that either both assertions or neither of them is correct. It is important to note here that the reason why these two assertions cannot be merged is that “they are fixed in advocating either the existence or the nonexistence [of the mind of the *Tathāgata*] (*dingwei youwu* 定謂有無)”. It is these two fixed positions that Chengguan challenges next.

He shows that these two positions can be merged or harmonised: “existence that is identical with actuality (*jizhenzhi you* 即真之有) and actuality that is identical with existence (*jiyouzhi zhen* 即有之真) are two aspects that become complete together (*eryi xiangcheng* 二義相成). It is the nonobstruction of existence and nonexistence”. He argues that the mind of *Tathāgata* cannot be described one-sidedly using terms like existence, nonexistence, pure, impure, “one”, various, animate or inanimate. In fact, these are in perfect interfusion without obstruction (*yuanrong wuai* 圓融無礙). Finally, he arrives at the conclusion that the mind of *Tathāgata* is both existent and nonexistent. Formerly, he refuted this assertion because of the fixed nature that was attributed to existence and nonexistence by *Faxiangzong* and *Faxingzong*. However, after eliminating the sharp lines between these two concepts by the *Huayan* way of interfusion and penetration, he managed to reconstruct this thesis on a different plane. Nonetheless the stage of fruition has remained ineffable, as Chengguan points out.

The *Faxiangzong* in Chengguan’s discussion is congruent with the elementary teaching of *Mahāyāna* in Fazang’s commentary and the first and second views in Huiyuan’s work. The tenets of the first and second masters of the *Faxiangzong* are identical with the first and second views, respectively. The *Faxingzong* can be related to the third view and the final teaching. However, the *Faxingzong* is also called *Wuxiangzong*, which is none other than the sudden teaching which Chengguan identified with the *Chan* lineage.²² The [*Huayan*] lineage is the perfect teaching and the fourth view.

²² While Fazang treated the sudden teaching as the fourth teaching, Chengguan degraded it to the level of third teaching, and identified it with the *Chan* teachings. This shift must be attributed to the growing popularity and influence of *Chan* by the second half of the Tang dynasty against which Chengguan emphasises the importance of doctrinal study. See Yoshizu (1985).

Fazang	Huiyuan	Chengguan
Elementary	1st view 2nd view	<i>Faxiangzong</i> 1st master 2nd master
Final	3rd view	<i>Faxingzong/Wuxiangzong</i>
Sudden		
Perfect	4th view	The [<i>Huayan</i>] lineage

Conclusion: The philological study of this short passage sheds light on certain aspects of medieval Chinese Buddhism.

1. As we saw, Indian Buddhist texts are ambiguous about the existence of mental activity in Buddha. Chinese Buddhism is frequently accused of misunderstanding or misinterpreting Indian Buddhist concepts. The sinification of Buddhism thus sometimes has the connotation of altering the “pure model” of Buddhism.²³ However, an analysis of this passage showed that the ambiguity of Indian texts about the nature of *Tathāgata* was recognised and carefully investigated by Chinese masters of Buddhist texts. In addition, they attempted to resolve this contradiction by applying the system of *panjiao*, which enabled them to interpret the teachings on different levels. No doubt, for *Huayan* monks the perfect teaching is the *Huayan*, which proclaims the infinite interpenetration of all things, tenets, etc. Apropos of this topic, this means that mental activity in Buddha both exists and does not exist without obstruction.

2. This study of Chinese commentaries reveals the development of the *Huayan* exegetical tradition. Fazang who definitely paved the way for the next generation of *Huayan* exegetes with his authoritative explanations of the scripture wrote the first sentence-by-sentence commentary of the *Huayanjing*. However, on the foundation laid by Fazang, Huiyuan and Chengguan modified the interpretation of the passage. Huiyuan left out the framework of five teachings that played a central role in Fazang’s philosophy, and he simply listed four views in connection with the text of the *sūtra*. Moreover, Chengguan who otherwise sharply criticised Huiyuan for his heretical views, and intended to reestablish the orthodoxy of Fazang, in fact, introduced two new categories, *Faxingzong* and *Faxiangzong*, instead of five teachings for the interpretation of the text.²⁴ One reason for the differences is that they were commenting on different versions of the *Huayanjing*. The other reason could be the different socio-religious backgrounds of these monks. Fazang who enjoyed the generous support of Empress Wu²⁵ did not wish to compromise with other Buddhist teachings and proclaimed the superior position of the *Huayan* teaching. Although Chengguan was an eminent and highly recognised monk in his day, by the second half of the Tang dynasty it became more important for the Buddhist community to establish unity in the face of waning imperial support. The emphasis in his teaching, therefore, shifted away from the superiority of *Huayan* to its all-inclusiveness.

²³ For a discussion of the term sinification in Buddhist studies, see Sharf (2002, pp. 1–27).

²⁴ For Chengguan’s criticisms of Huiyuan, see Sakamoto (1964, pp. 58–110).

²⁵ For a thorough study of how Empress Wu used Buddhism as an ideology, see Forte (1976). For Tang emperors and Buddhism, see Weinstein (1973, 1987).

3. Last but not least, it is important to underline the role of commentary as a genre in Chinese Buddhism. As in other traditional cultures, commentary was held in high esteem in China, and its prevalence cannot be overemphasised.²⁶ If we examine the *Taishō* edition of the Chinese Buddhist canon we find that eleven and a half volumes (33–44) include the commentaries while the treatises fill only four and a half volumes (44–48). The method of writing a Buddhist commentary evolved through the centuries and reached its apogee during the Tang dynasty.²⁷ Chengguan's commentary and subcommentary on the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing* are masterpieces of this genre. They include a very elaborate outline, *kepan* 科判 or *kewen* 科文, which is a Chinese invention in Buddhist exegesis. His commentaries represent not only explanations of the *sūtra* text but also an encyclopedia, or *Summa Theologiae*, of the Buddhist knowledge of medieval China. In what follows, you will find an outline and translation of Chengguan's commentary and subcommentary on the passage studied in this article. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time that a section of his *Magnum Opus* has been made available in English.²⁸

Outline of the text

1. explanation of the meaning of the text
2. separately expounding varying explanations
 - 2.1. introduction
 - 2.2. other views
 - 2.2.1. two masters of the *Faxiang* lineage
 - 2.2.1.1. the first master
 - 2.2.1.1.1. thesis
 - 2.2.1.1.2. refutation of objection
 - 2.2.1.1.3. contraposition
 - 2.2.1.1.4. scriptural evidence
 - 2.2.1.1.5. refutation of objection again
 - 2.2.1.2. the second master
 - 2.2.1.2.1. thesis
 - 2.2.1.2.2. scriptural evidence
 - 2.2.1.2.3. refutation of objection

²⁶ For a study of common features of commentaries in different cultures, and especially in China, see Henderson (1991).

²⁷ The only thorough treatment of the history of Chinese Buddhist commentary writing is Ōchō's early article (1937, reprint 1979). For an English study of the early period, see Kanno (2002).

²⁸ I translated into Hungarian a section from his introduction (*xuantan* 玄談) to the commentary and his selected commentaries on the chapter *Manifestation of the Tathāgata*. See Hamar (1998c, pp. 85–135; 2002b, pp. 75–155).

- 2.2.2. conclusion of the above topic and introduction to a new one
- 2.2.3. masters of *Wuxiangzong* and *Faxingzong*
 - 2.2.3.1. thesis
 - 2.2.3.2. scriptural evidence
- 3. coalescence of explanations through a return to [the *Huayan*] lineage
 - 3.1. errors of one-sidedness
 - 3.1.1. topic
 - 3.1.1.1. explanation
 - 3.1.1.1.1. separate refutation
 - 3.1.1.1.1.1. refutation of *Faxiangzong*
 - 3.1.1.1.1.1.1. direct refutation
 - 3.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. in contradiction to doctrine
 - 3.1.1.1.1.1.1.2. in contradiction to the text
 - 3.1.1.1.1.1.2. indirect refutation
 - 3.1.1.1.1.1.3. refutation of objections
 - 3.1.1.1.1.1.3.1. first objection
 - 3.1.1.1.1.1.3.2. second objection
 - 3.1.1.1.1.2. refutation of *Faxingzong*
 - 3.1.1.1.1.2.1. direct refutation
 - 3.1.1.1.1.2.1.1. in contradiction to doctrine
 - 3.1.1.1.1.2.1.2. in contradiction to the text
 - 3.1.1.1.1.2.2. indirect refutation
 - 3.1.1.1.1.2.2.1. in contradiction to doctrine
 - 3.1.1.1.1.2.2.2. in contradiction to the text
 - 3.1.1.1.2. joint refutation
 - 3.2. summary of the correct doctrine
 - 3.2.1. link between the previous and the next parts
 - 3.2.2. two topics in two sections
 - 3.2.3. a different explanation of the two views
 - 3.2.3.1. coalescence of two lineages
 - 3.2.3.1.1. separately
 - 3.2.3.1.1.1. *Faxingzong*
 - 3.2.3.1.1.2. *Faxiangzong*
 - 3.2.3.1.2. together
 - 3.2.3.2. explanation of the *Sūtra*
 - 3.2.3.2.1. brief clarification
 - 3.2.3.2.2. scriptural evidence
 - 3.2.3.2.3. extensive explanation
 - 3.2.3.2.3.1. negative statements
 - 3.2.3.2.3.1.1. one-sided expressions cannot completely convey its principle
 - 3.2.3.2.3.1.2. the unification of *xing* and *xiang* is unfathomable

- 3.2.3.2.3.1.3. inclusion of *xing* and *xiang* can be only revealed with interfusion of the doctrines of the two lineages
- 3.2.3.2.3.1.4. as they are neither identical nor different, it is difficult to describe
 - 3.2.3.2.3.1.4.1. the treatment of the mind-king from the aspect of eight consciousnesses
 - 3.2.3.2.3.1.4.2. the treatment of the king and its associate in opposition
 - 3.2.3.2.3.1.4.3. conclusion for all [doctrines]
- 3.2.3.2.3.2. explanation of profundity using positive statements
- 3.2.4. a humble conclusion

Translation²⁹

SON OF BUDDHA, HOW SHOULD THE *BODHISATTVA MAHĀSATTVAS* KNOW THE MIND OF *TATHĀGATA*, *ARHAT* AND THE COMPLETELY ENLIGHTENED BEING?

SONS OF BUDDHA, THE MIND, THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF *TATHĀGATA* CANNOT BE GRASPED, BUT GIVEN HIS INFINITE WISDOM THE MIND OF *TATHĀGATA* SHOULD BE KNOWN.

/1. *explanation of the meaning of the text*/ “THE MIND, THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF *TATHĀGATA* CANNOT BE GRASPED” is the negative statement (*zhequan* 遮詮) from the aspect of essence, and “BUT GIVEN HIS INFINITE WISDOM THE MIND OF *TATHĀGATA* SHOULD BE KNOWN” is the positive statement (*biaoquan* 表詮) relying on function.

Subcommentary (hereafter \square): The mind is the king, the mind is treated as the essence and thus wisdom is subordinate. Function is clarified from the aspect of the subordinate. Essence cannot be described using positive statements; therefore, only negative statements [can be applied]. Features of function can be clarified; therefore, positive statements are

²⁹ I am very grateful to Professor Aramaki Noritoshi for his invaluable assistance in understanding this text while I was a visiting researcher at the Ōtani University in 2002. However, I take full responsibility for all the mistakes in the translation. For my translation, I used the edition that contains the *sūtra* along with Chengguan’s commentary and subcommentary. This edition was organised by Chiang Tsu Chuang 蔣竹莊 in 1936 in Shanghai, and during this project more than twenty different versions were collated. A reprint edition was made by Nanting 南亭 in Taiwan in 1966: *Huayanjing shuchao* 華嚴經疏鈔. 10 vols. Xinwenfeng chubanshe, Taipei. Recently, a revised edition of this work, *Xinxu huayanjing shuchao* 新修華嚴經疏鈔, has been undertaken by the Huayan Society 華嚴蓮社 in Taipei under the guidance of Master Chengyi 成一. The chapter *Manifestation of the Tathāgata* has not been published yet, as only 10 of the scheduled 20 volumes have been released to date; I thus had to rely on the previous edition in my translation. This new edition includes references for all works that Chengguan quotes; therefore, it is a very useful work for those studying Chengguan’s writings. For the relevant parts in the *Taishō* edition, see *Dafangguang fo huayanjing shu* 大方廣佛華嚴經疏 (T 35, 1735: 878a10–878c5); *Dafanguang fo huayanjing suishu yanyi* 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義 (T 36, 1736: 617c27–619b18).

applied. However, function is also referred to using negative statements, as it is identical with essence and is immeasurable. If it were described only using negative statements, it could not manifest its subtlety (*miao* 妙). Therefore, positive statements are used to discuss the Enigmatic Supreme (*xuanji* 玄極). *Relying* means that by relying on the subordinate the king is manifested. By relying on function essence is manifested. Function and mental associates (*xinsuo* 心所)³⁰ both have negative implications. In this context we only rely upon their positive [sense] in order to illumine their profundity.

/2. separately expounding varying explanations/

/2.1. introduction/ There were many explanations of this passage in the past.

/2.2. other views/

/2.2.1. two masters of the Faxiang lineage (Faxiangzong 法相宗)/

/2.2.1.1 the first master/

/2.2.1.1.1. thesis (zhengming 正明)/ The first [master] says that there are two kinds of consciousness: defiled and pure. At the level of Buddha, that [kind of] mind and mental associates that is under the sway of impurities (*sāsrava*, *youlou* 有漏) [and hence] defiled is absent, but mind and mental associates belonging to the pure [kind] do exist.

☐: [Buddha] has only eight consciousnesses as the mind-king and twenty-one mental associates, i.e. five always active, five specific and eleven advantageous ones.

/2.2.1.1.2. refutation of objection (jiefang 解妨)/ At the stage of fruition, wisdom is strong and consciousness is weak. Thus, as for the king, [the *Sūtra*] shows it [to be one of which] the defiled [kind] does not exist, and his wisdom that pertains to [the mind] is illuminated as being immeasurable.

☐: Someone may [object] asking: “If it is like that, then the king and the subordinate both exist. Why does the [*Sūtra*] say that as for the king, it CANNOT BE GRASPED?” This is why it is explained that at the stage of fruition the consciousness is weak. This is the reason for saying CANNOT BE GRASPED. As wisdom is strong, it is said to be immeasurable. *Consciousness is weak* means that it has only pure aspects of the two aspects; it is not identical with that of sentient beings whose discrimination is strong. *Wisdom is strong* means that there is no being unwise (*dausprajña*, *ehui* 惡慧) (see Nakamura 1975, p. 18b), because determination (*vinīścaya*, *jueduan* 決斷) is dominant.

³⁰ There are six groups of mental associates: always-active (*sarvatraga*, *bianxing* 遍行), specific (*viniyata*, *biejing* 別境), advantageous (*kuśala*, *shan* 善), mental disturbances (*kleśa*, *fannaο* 煩惱), secondary mental disturbances (*upakleśa*, *sui fannaο* 隨煩惱), and indeterminate (*aniyata*, *buding* 不定). Altogether, there are 51 mental associates. See Lusthaus (2002, pp. 542–543).

/2.2.1.1.3. *contraposition (fancheng 反成)*³¹/ If there is no king, how can the dependent be established?

☐: Wisdom is a mental associate. Without the mind-king what could wisdom rely on?

/2.2.1.1.4. *scriptural evidence (yinzheng 引證)*/ That is why the third volume of *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 cites *Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing* 如來功德莊嚴經³² saying: “The undefiled mind (*amala-vijñāna*, *wugoushi* 無垢識) of the *Tathāgata* is the pure realm without impurities; it is liberated from all obstacles and is associated with the wisdom of the perfect mirror (*ādarśa-jñāna*, *yuanjingzhi* 圓鏡智)”;³³ therefore it is clear that [even in the case of the Buddha] there is the king (i.e. *citta* exists).

☐: *The pure realm without impurities* means that impurities are defilement. *The undefiled mind* means that [the *Tathāgata*] has consciousness. *It is associated with the perfect mirror wisdom* makes clear that his mind-king exists and is associated with the subordinate. The subordinate is not established independently. Thus it concludes that *it is clear that [even in the case of the Buddha] there is the king (i.e. citta exists)*.

/2.2.1.1.5. *refutation of objection again (chongtong fangnan 重通妨難)*/ Transmutation of consciousness (*zhuanshi* 轉識) means that wisdom evolves by relying on consciousness, but it is not the case that [when attaining Buddhahood] one transmutes the essence of consciousness [into wisdom].

☐: Someone may object saying that as it was said the four kinds of wisdom are completed by the transmutation of eight consciousnesses.³⁴ It is thus clear that only wisdom exists and consciousness does not exist. This is the reason for explaining here that *wisdom evolves by relying on consciousness*. *Wisdom evolves by relying on consciousness* means that consciousness is the ruler (*zhu* 主), and wisdom is not. Still, [in order to explain why earlier sources like *Mahāyānasamgraha* express themselves in such a way as if] “consciousness only” were transmuted, we have the opinion of three masters. Here, all of them are referred to. This is one of them. [When it was stated] above that [in the state of

³¹ The expression *fancheng* literally means “reverse establishment”. It might be the Chinese translation of the Sanskrit logical term *vyatireka*, though Nakamura gives the Chinese word *yanli* 遠離 for this Sanskrit term. See Nakamura (1975, p. 140b). The classical example for *vyatireka* in Buddhist logic is “wheresoever there is no fire, neither is there smoke”. See Stcherbatsky (1930–1932, vol. 1, pp. 301–303). In our context: if there is no mind, there is no wisdom.

³² This *sūtra* has not been translated into Chinese. See Kamata (1999, p. 644).

³³ See T 31,1585:13c24; Cook (1999, p. 82). For other translations of the *Cheng weishi lun*, see La Vallée Poussin (1928) and Wei (1973).

³⁴ The four kinds of wisdom are acquired by the transmutation of the mental *dharmas* associated with the eighth, seventh, sixth, and first five consciousnesses, respectively. 此轉有漏八七六五識相應品，如次而得。 (T 31, 1585: 56b2–3). See Cook (1999, pp. 348–349).

Buddhahood] *wisdom is strong and consciousness is weak*, this is [the opinion of] another master.³⁵

/2.2.1.2. *the second master*/

/2.2.1.2.1. *thesis*/ As the [*Tathāgata*] does not have [the mental activity of] accumulating [*karma*], thinking, etc., his mind is said not to be grasped. His nondiscriminative wisdom manifests in innumerable ways. It is not that it does not have the essence of the mind (*xinti* 心體).

[S]: *Accumulating [karma]* is called the mind; *thinking* is called thought; discrimination is called consciousness. Now, at the stage of fruition the eighth [consciousness, i.e. *ālayavijñāna*] manifests [actual cognitions] without accumulating [karmic] seeds. The seventh [consciousness, i.e. *manas*] does not think the eighth [consciousness] to be an ego. *Etc.* refers to the first six [consciousnesses] that do not discriminate objects. The reason for this is that all of them are associated with the four kinds of wisdom.³⁶ Therefore, it is said that they do not exist. However, this is not to say that [the *Tathāgata*] does not possess the nonaccumulating eighth [consciousness], nonthinking seventh [consciousness], and nondiscriminative six [consciousnesses]. It thus concludes that *it is not that it does not have the essence of mind*.

/2.2.1.2.2. *scriptural evidence*/ Therefore, the eighth fascicle of *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha[-upanibandhana]* says: “The support of the nondiscriminative wisdom is not mind, because it is not reflection on meaning.”

[S]: *is not mind, because it is not reflection on meaning* clarifies that the eighth [consciousness] does not accumulate, the seventh [consciousness] does not think, etc.

/2.2.1.2.3. *refutation of objection (zhejiu 遮救)*/ “Nor is it [the case that it] has non-mind as its support (*suoyizhi* 所依止), as it is a kind of mind (*xinzhonglei* 心種類). The mind is regarded as [its] cause. Through the power of the repeated cultiva-

³⁵ Chengguan here paraphrases the following passage from the *Cheng weishi lun*: 智雖非識而依識轉識為主故說轉識得。又有漏位智劣識強，無漏位中智強識劣。(T 31, 1585: 56b3–4). In Cook’s translation: “Even though knowledge is not consciousness, it nevertheless evolves supported by consciousness. Inasmuch as consciousness is ‘king,’ [knowledge] is said to be acquired by the transmutation of consciousnesses. Also, in an impure state, knowledge is weak and consciousness is strong, while in a pure state knowledge is strong and consciousness is weak.” Cook (1999, p. 349).

³⁶ There are four kinds of wisdom: 1. wisdom of the great, perfect mirror (*ādarśa-jñāna*, *yuan jingzhi* 圓鏡智) that reflects all forms without discrimination; 2. wisdom of sameness (*samātā-jñāna*, *pingdengxing zhi* 平等性智) that treats everything equally; 3. wisdom of wonderful observation (*pratyavekṣaṇā-jñāna*, *miao guan cha zhi* 妙觀察智), which sees the real nature of everything; 4. wisdom of achieving the task (*kṛtya-anuṣṭhāna-jñāna*, *cheng suozuo zhi* 成所作智) that benefits living beings with three kinds of deed (mental, verbal, and physical). For a discussion of these terms in *Cheng weishi lun*, see T 31, 1585: 56a12–57a12. Cook (1999, pp. 347–353).

tion [of the mind] the stage [of fruition] is attained by [the *Tathāgata*]. Therefore it is called a kind of mind.”³⁷

☐: Someone might raise an objection saying that if [the *Tathāgata*] does not have an aspect of mind, then nondiscriminative wisdom must rely on matter (*rūpa*, 色). Hence it is shown that the king that is support is not completely without essence. Above this is generally stated (*zong-biao* 總標) that [the *Tathāgata*] has [a mind]. Next, starting at *it is a kind of mind* [the commentary] explains what it means for [the *Tathāgata*] to have [a mind]. How could it be non-mind if it is said to be *a kind of mind*? Next from *the mind is regarded as [its] cause* it explains again [why] his mind is a kind of [mind]. *The stage* refers to the stage of fruition. This is to say that because the eight pure consciousnesses of the stage of fruition are attained by means of the accumulating mind, etc. as the cause, the [basis of non-conceptual insight of the *bodhisattvas*] cannot be called a non-mind. It is like the nonindicative form (*avijñapti-rūpa*, 無表色) that is born relying on the indicative form (*vijñapti-rūpa*, 表色).³⁸ This is the reason why it is called form. It is on these grounds that the non-accumulating mind, etc. received their names.

/2.2.2. conclusion of the topic above and introduction to a new one (*jieqian shenghou* 結前生後)/ The two explanations above both clarify that the mind, thought and consciousness of [the *Tathāgata*] exist.

☐: It concludes the two [explanations] by *Faxiangzong* and introduces one explanation by *Faxingzong*. Question: What is the difference [between the two explanations by *Faxiangzong*] if both of them [state that the *Tathāgata*] has [a mind]? Answer: The former explains that [the *Tathāgata*] has a pure [mind] but not a defiled one. The latter expounds that [the *Tathāgata*] has an essence but not a function. Therefore, their meanings are different. Still, two meanings are completed mutually: as

³⁷ Here Chengguan quotes from Asvabhāva’s commentary on *Mahāyānasamgraha*: 謂無分別智所依非心，非思議故。亦非非心為所依止心種類故以心為因，數習勢力引得此位，名心種類。(T 31, 1598: 430a5–8.) It comments on the following verse from the Xuanzang’s version of *Mahāyānasamgraha*: 諸菩薩所依 非心而是心 是無分別智 非思議種類。(T 31, 1594: 147c4–5.) Paramārtha’s rendition: 諸菩薩依止 非心非非心 是無分別智 非思議種類故。(T 31, 1593: 128a18–19.) “For all bodhisattvas the support is/ Neither thinking nor the absence of thinking./ For non-imaginative wisdom is not a not-thinking / But is something that rapidly [issues from thinking].” See Keenan (1992, pp. 93–94). Vasubandhu also uses the expression “a kind of mind” in his commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha*: 此智所依不名為心，不思議故，亦非非心，心所引故，此生所依是心種類，亦名為心因彼而生。(T 31, 1597: 364b2–4.)

³⁸ In the English version of La Vallée Poussin’s translation it is “non-informative” and is defined as follows: “This is an action which does not cause anything to be known to another, and in this it resembles mental action; but it is matter (*rūpa*), in that it resembles bodily and vocal action.” See La Vallée Poussin (1991, pp. 136–137). For a demonstration of nonexistence of indicative and nonindicative forms in *Cheng weishi lun*, see T 31, 1585: 4c8–5a6. Cook (1999, pp. 27–28).

[the *Tathāgata*] does not think, etc. he does not have a defiled [mind]; as he does not have a defiled [mind], he does not have the aspect of accumulation, thinking, etc.

/2.2.3. masters of *Wuxiangzong* 無相宗 and *Faxingzong* 法性宗/

/2.2.3.1. thesis/ Buddha in fact does not have a mind, thought or consciousness, nor any *dharmas* of the mind (*citta-dharma*, *xinfa* 心法).³⁹ [That is why the *Sūtra*] says CANNOT BE GRASPED. He has only great wisdom; this is why it says GIVEN HIS INFINITE WISDOM THE MIND OF *Tathāgata* is KNOWN.

/2.2.3.2. scriptural evidence/ This is why the *Suvarna-prabhāsa-uttama Sūtra* and the Paramārtha's translation of *Mahāyānasamgraha[-bhāṣya]* say: "Only Suchness (*tathatā*, *ruru* 如如) and the wisdom of Suchness exist alone."⁴⁰ According to the *Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna*, five *dharmas* contain the nature of great awakening (*dajuexing* 大覺性): the one real *dharma-dhātu* (*yizhen fajie* 一真法界) and the four kinds of wisdom of enlightenment (*sizhi puti* 四智菩提) (see T 26, 1530: 301b23). It does not mention any other *dharmas*.

☐: The Treatise [*Mahāyānasamgraha*] says "the body of self-nature means *dharma-kāya* (*fashen* 法身)".⁴¹ It is explained that *only Suchness and the wisdom of Suchness exist alone*. This is called *dharma-kāya*.

/3. coalescence of explanations through a return to [the *Huayan*] lineage/

/3.1. errors of one-sidedness/

/3.1.1. topic (*biao* 標)/ The two lineages discussed above are both one-sided; therefore, they are refuted.

/3.1.1.1 explanation/

/3.1.1.1.1. separate refutation (*lipo* 離破)/

/3.1.1.1.1.1. refutation of *Faxiangzong*/

/3.1.1.1.1.1.1. direct refutation (*duopo* 奪破)⁴²

/3.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. in contradiction to doctrine (*weiyi* 違義)/ If the former [interpretation that the *Tathāgata*] has a mind is accepted, then [the extreme of] increase (*zengyi* 增益) is not avoided.⁴³

³⁹ Eight consciousnesses are called *dharmas* of mind. See Lusthaus (2002, p. 542).

⁴⁰ The sources state this in connection with *dharma-kāya*: 惟有如如如如智，是名法身 (T 16, 664: 363a6.) 云何知此法依止法身，不離清淨及圓智，即如如如如智故。 (T 31, 1595: 249c26–28.)

⁴¹ 此中自性身者。是諸如來法身。於一切法自在依止故 (T 31, 1593: 129c4–5.) "Among these, the Essence body is the Dharma body of *Tathāgatas*, because it is the support for mastering all things." See Keenan (1992, p. 105).

⁴² The expression *duopo* literally means "grasping refutation".

⁴³ According to the *Faxiangzong*, there are two erroneous views regarding self and *dharmas*. One of them is to think that self and *dharmas* in fact exist. It is called "increase". The other one is to think that self and *dharmas* do not exist at all. It is called "decrease". For the occurrence of this term in the *Cheng weishi lun*, see T 31, 1585: 1b13. The *Cheng weishi lun* concludes: "These forms are metaphorical constructions based on the transformation of consciousness." See Cook (1999, p. 10).

☐: It cannot [complete the definition] of being identical with both existence and emptiness (*jiyou jikong* 即有即空); therefore, it becomes *increase*.

/3.1.1.1.1.1.2. *in contradiction to the text (weiwen 違文)*/ Thus it cannot explain the meaning of CANNOT BE GRASPED.

☐: The text says that THE MIND, THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF *TATHĀGATA* CANNOT BE GRASPED; it does not say that the defiled [MIND, THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF *TATHĀGATA*] CANNOT BE GRASPED.

/3.1.1.1.1.1.2. *indirect refutation (zongpo 縱破)*⁴⁴ Why does the *Sūtra* not mention the pure aspect (*jingfen* 淨分)?

☐: If we suppose that [the *Tathāgata*] has a pure [mind] but does not have a defiled [mind], why does the *Sūtra* not mention that [his mind] has a pure aspect?

/3.1.1.1.1.1.3. *refutation of objections (zhejiu 遮救)*/

/3.1.1.1.1.1.3.1. *first objection*/ Is the undefiled consciousness not mentioned [elsewhere]?

☐: We are afraid that somebody could raise an objection saying that pure characteristics (*jingxiang* 淨相) are difficult to describe; thus it is not elaborated. Now, it is refuted with the question [in this case] why the [*Rulai gongde*] *zhuangyan jing* mentioned the consciousness without “impurity” (*wuloushi* 無漏識).

/3.1.1.1.1.1.3.2. *second objection*/ Why does the *Sūtra* not say that the defiled [mind] CANNOT BE GRASPED?

☐: We are afraid that somebody could raise an objection saying that CANNOT BE GRASPED refers to (*yizai* 意在) the defiled [mind]. It is thus refuted with the question [in this case] why [*the Sūtra*] does not say that the defiled [mind] CANNOT BE GRASPED.

/3.1.1.1.1.2. *refutation of Faxingzong*/

/3.1.1.1.1.2.1 *direct refutation*/

/3.1.1.1.1.2.1.1. *in contradiction to doctrine*/ If the latter interpretation is accepted, then [the extreme of] decrease (*sunjian* 損減) is not avoided.

☐: Emptiness obstructs existence (*kong ai you* 空礙有); therefore, it says *decrease*.

⁴⁴ The expression *zongpo* literally means “refutation by supposition”, which reveals the wrong consequences of a statement.

/3.1.1.1.2.1.2. *in contradiction to the text*/ It cannot explain the meaning of THE MIND [OF *TATHĀGATA* SHOULD] BE KNOWN. [The *Sūtra*] says GIVEN HIS INFINITE WISDOM THE MIND OF *TATHĀGATA* SHOULD BE KNOWN. It does not say that he does not have a mind that can be known. Thus it is obvious that this is not to say that he does not have a mind.

☐: As it is stated in the text: GIVEN HIS INFINITE WISDOM THE MIND OF *TATHĀGATA* SHOULD BE KNOWN. It does not say that the wisdom of *Tathāgata* is to be known. Thus it is clear that relying on wisdom his mind is to be known. Therefore, he has a mind.

/3.1.1.1.2.2. *indirect refutation*/

/3.1.1.1.2.2.1. *in contradiction to doctrine*/ If we [accept that] he does not have a mind, then how could wisdom be established alone [apart from a mind]?

☐: If we suppose that as you [said] the mind does not exist but wisdom exists, this results in two errors. First, it is in contradiction to doctrine. As the mind-king is the most excellent (*zuisheng* 最勝), if yet you say that it does not exist, wisdom has nothing to rely on. How can it be established alone? Just like without a monarch (*junzhu* 君主) how can there be a subject (*chenxia* 臣下)?

/3.1.1.1.2.2.2. *in contradiction to the text*/ This is not only in contradiction to the two texts above, but also to the meaning of the *Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]*, which says that in the state of *nirvāṇa* the impermanent consciousness is extinct, but permanent consciousness (*changshi* 常識) is obtained.

☐: The two texts above refer to the [*Cheng*] *weishi [lun]* and the *Mahāyānasamgraha*. In the state of *nirvāṇa* the impermanent refers to the five aggregates (*skandha*, *yun* 蘊). The [*Mahāparinirvāṇa*] *Sūtra* says, “Kaunḍīnya, as the impermanent form is extinct, the permanent form is obtained. This holds true for form, feeling, conception, and volition.”⁴⁵ As he has a permanent consciousness, he has a mind.

/3.1.1.2. *joint refutation (hepo 合破)*/ If we accept both of the two doctrines [of the two lineages], contradiction is not avoided. If we reject both of them, it is better to avoid idle discourse (*prapañca*, *xilun* 戲論).

⁴⁵ The original text is slightly different. 爾時世尊告橋陳如，色是無常，因滅是色，獲得解脫常住之色。受想行識亦是無常，因滅是識，獲得解脫常住之識。(T 12, 374: 590c6–8.) “At that time the World Honored told Kaunḍīnya: ‘Form is impermanent. As [in the state of *nirvāṇa*] this form is extinct, the liberated and permanent form is obtained. This holds true for feeling, conception, volition and consciousness. When this consciousness is extinct, the liberated and permanent consciousness is obtained.’” (T 12, 374: 590c6–8.)

§: The joint refutation of the two lineages leads to the four denials (*apavāda*, *bang* 謗).⁴⁶ Here we refute the objection. Someone could ask: “If the two lineages are one-sided, why would it be a mistake to merge them?” This is the reason for saying that *contradiction [is not avoided]*. Hence they are fixed in advocating either the existence or the nonexistence [of the mind of the *Tathāgata*] (*dingwei youwu* 定謂有無). It is not the nonexistence that is identical with existence (*jiyouzhiwu* 即有之無), and not the existence that is identical with nonexistence (*jiwuzhiyou* 即無之有). [Someone could ask:] “Is it not plausible that both of them are rejected?” We answer that *it is better to avoid idle discourse*, as [in this case] there would be no right explanation.

/3.2. summary of the correct doctrine (*zhengyi* 正義)/

/3.2.1. link between the previous and the next parts (*zhengqian qihou* 徵前起後)/ If it is like that, what is the right direction?

/3.2.2. two topics in two sections/ Now, we explain this [correct] doctrine. The first [topic] is the coalescence of the above two lineages; the second [topic] is the interpretation of the meaning of the *Sūtra* (*xiao jingyi* 消經意).

/3.2.3. a different explanation of the two views/

/3.2.3.1. coalescence of the two lineages/

/3.2.3.1.1. separately/

/3.2.3.1.1.1. *Faxingzong*/ Now, first [we turn to] the latter lineage which says that “only the wisdom of *Tathatā* [exists]”. As his mind is identical with actual nature (*zhenxing* 真性), it says “only *Tathatā*”. As the function of brightness (*zhao-yong* 照用) is not lost, it says “the wisdom of *Tathatā*”. How could wisdom exist apart from the mind? Thus “only *Tathatā*” is not in contradiction to (*bu guaiyu* 不乖於) the existence [of his mind].

§: According to *Faxingzong*, his mind is identical with *Tathatā*, and his wisdom is the wisdom of *Tathatā*. [However,] there is no *Tathatā* apart from the mind; thus it is known that if he has *Tathatā*, he must have a mind. In addition, function that is identical with essence (*jitizhi yong* 即體之用) is called the wisdom of *Tathatā*, and essence that is identical with function (*jiyongzhi ti* 即用之體) is called *Tathatā* (*zhenru* 真如). It is like a bright pearl. The essence of the pearl is the *Tathatā*, and its brightness is the wisdom of *Tathatā*. How could *Tathatā* exist without a mind?

⁴⁶ I.e. 1. denial of existence of the mind of *Tathāgata*, 2. denial of its nonexistence, 3. denial of both its existence and its nonexistence, 4. denial of neither its existence nor its nonexistence. This is the negative form of the four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi*, *siju* 四句) of *Madhyamaka*. For the application of them in Chinese *Madhyamaka*, see Ng (1993, pp. 90–123).

/3.2.3.1.1.2. *Faxiangzong*/ According to the former lineage, he has a pure mind due to the essence of immaculate *Tathatā*. His mind is identical with *Tathatā*. Why would it be wrong [to say] that he has a mind?

☐: According to the *Faxiangzong*, [the] existence [of his mind] is identical with *Tathatā*. How could its existence be in contradiction to *Tathatā*? It is like objects that are identical with voidness. Thus it is not wrong to say that [the *Tathāgata*] has a mind.

/3.2.3.1.2. *together*/ From this it is known that existence that is identical with actuality (*jizhenzhi you* 即真之有) and actuality that is identical with existence (*jiyouzhi zhen* 即有之真) are two aspects that become complete together (*eryi xiangcheng* 二義相成). It is the nonobstruction of existence and nonexistence.

☐: *Existence that is identical with actuality* refers to the *Faxiangzong*, and *actuality that is identical with existence* refers to the *Faxingzong*. If these two [views] are not separated, just then will the actual Buddhahood that is nonobstructed be complete.

/3.2.3.2. *explanation of the Sūtra*/

/3.2.3.2.1. *brief clarification*/ Second is the interpretation of the meaning in the *Sūtra*. CANNOT BE GRASPED means that the definition of the mind [of *Tathāgata*] is profound and enigmatic (*shenxuan* 深玄). It cannot be described; thus its profundity is revealed through a reliance on negation. BUT DUE TO [INFINITE] WISDOM THE MIND OF *TATHĀGATA* SHOULD BE KNOWN means that depending on mental associates its profundity can be revealed through a reliance on positive statements.

☐: It [discusses] the two topics of positive and negative statements.

/3.2.3.2.2. *scriptural evidence*/ That is the reason why the Jin [translation of] the *Sūtra* says: “If somebody knows the immeasurability of the wisdom of *Tathāgata*, he/she knows the immeasurability of his mind.”⁴⁷

☐: It proves both positive and negative statements. It says *he/she knows the immeasurability of his mind*; thus [the *Tathāgata*] has a mind. There is no flaw in this.

/3.2.3.2.3. *extensive explanation*/

/3.2.3.2.3.1. *negative statements*/

/3.2.3.2.3.1.1. *one-sided expressions cannot completely convey its principle* (*jinli* 盡理)/ What does [the mind of *Tathāgata*] *is profound and enigmatic* mean? (1) If someone wants to say that it exists, [this is wrong] as it is beyond characteristics (*juexiang* 絕相) like *Tathatā*. If someone wants to say that it does not exist, [this is wrong] as its apparitions (*youling* 幽靈) never cease.⁴⁸ (2) If someone wants to say

⁴⁷ This refers to Buddhahadra’s translation in 60 fascicles. See T 9, 278: b14.

⁴⁸ *Youling* is the traditional Chinese designation of the spirit of a deceased person.

that it is defiled, [this is wrong] as it is devoid of all burdens [of defilements]. If someone wants to say that it is pure [this is wrong] as it has not cut off its evil nature (*xing'e* 性惡). (3) If someone wants to say that it is “one”, [this is wrong] as there is nothing that it does not include. If someone wants to say that it is varied, [this is wrong] as its one-flavor cannot be distinguished. (4) If someone wants to say that it is animate (*youqing* 有情), [this is wrong] as it is not different from the nature of forms (*sexing* 色性). If someone wants to say that it is inanimate (*wuqing* 無情), [this is wrong] as there is no soul (*you* 幽) that it does not penetrate.

☐: Here four pairs [of terms] are found: (1) existence or nonexistence, which are the opposite [views] of the two lineages; (2) pure or impure, which are the [views of] *Faxiangzong*; (3) “one” or varied, which are common [views] of the two lineages; (4) animate or inanimate, which also refer to the two lineages. (1) Phenomena (*shi* 事) are identical with principle (*li* 理); therefore, they do not exist. Principle does not lose (*shi* 失) phenomena; therefore, it is not nonexistent. (2) It is pure from the aspect that it is beyond characteristics, and it is defiled from the aspect that it unites [good and evil] natures. *It has not cut off its evil nature* means that “good” and “evil” are both the nature of the mind. If it cuts off its evil nature, it cuts off the nature of the mind.⁴⁹ [However,] nature cannot be cut off. Moreover, *icchantikās* (*chānti* 闍提) have not cut off good nature.⁵⁰ (3) Characteristics that are identical with essence (*jītīzhī xiāng* 即體之相) can include the *one-flavor* of essence that is identical with characteristics (*jīxiāngzhī tǐ* 即相之體). (4) Essence that is identical with function (*jīyōngzhī tǐ* 即用之體) is identical with form, and function that is identical with essence (*jītīzhī yōng* 即體之用) *penetrates souls*. *It is not different from the nature of forms* refers to the *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna* which says: “It is known that the nature of forms is identical with the nature of wisdom; therefore, it is

⁴⁹ This is a reference to the thesis of evil nature of *Tathāgata* formulated by Zhiyi 智顛 (538–597), the founder of the *Tiantai* lineage. Zhiyi makes this conclusion on the basis of the mutual embodiment of ten realms which claims that the realm of the Buddha includes the ten suchlikes of evil realms. He stresses that though the *Tathāgata* has the nature of evil, he does not practice evil. This evil nature enables Buddha to descend into the realm of hell to save beings destined to be reborn there. See Liu (1994, pp. 240–242). For a recent publication on the philosophical implications of the evil nature of the *Tathāgata*, see Ziporyn (2000). Chengguan is said to have studied under the famous *Tiantai* master Zhanran. See Hamar (2002a, pp. 38–39).

⁵⁰ Whether *icchantikās* (those beings who cut off their roots of goodness) have a Buddha-nature or not has long been debated in Chinese Buddhism. First, it was Daosheng who boldly claimed that they have a Buddha-nature, though Faxian’s translation of *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* disproved this. However, later his statement was substantiated by Dharmakṣema’s translation of this *sūtra*. For Daosheng’s view on Buddha-nature, see Kim (1990, pp. 34–38). When Xuanzang introduced his *Yogācāra* teaching it again became a subject of fierce debate, as according to Indian *Yogācāra icchantikās* can never become Buddha. For this teaching and the reaction of those Chinese masters who believed in universal enlightenment, see Gimello (1976, pp. 352–362). It is interesting to note that the founder of the Japanese *Tendai* school, Saichō (767–822), also debated this question with the *Hossō* monk Tokuitsu (780?–842?). See Groner (2000, pp. 91–106).

called the body of wisdom. It is known that the nature of wisdom is identical with the characteristics of forms; therefore, it is called the *dharmakāya* that penetrates all places.”⁵¹ In addition, the chapter entitled *Religious Practice* says: “[enlightening beings] will know all things are the mind’s own nature”.⁵² How could the nature of animate and inanimate be different in terms of essence?

/3.2.3.2.3.1.2. the unification of xing and xiang is unfathomable/ If you want to discuss it, words will miss the point. If you want to think about it, thoughts will not reach it. Because the stage of fruition is ineffable.

/3.2.3.2.3.1.3. inclusion of xing and xiang can only be revealed with the interfusion of the doctrines of the two lineages/ [From the above statements] we know that the mind of Buddha is both existent and nonexistent, both phenomena and principle, both king and subordinate, both “one” and “many”.

/3.2.3.2.3.1.4. as they are neither identical nor different, it is difficult to describe/

/3.2.3.2.3.1.4.1. the treatment of the mind-king from the aspect of eight consciousnesses/ In the mind (*xin* 心) there is no thought (*yi* 意), and it is not that there is not. In thought there is no mind, and it is not that there is not.

/3.2.3.2.3.1.4.2. the treatment of the king and its associate in opposition/ The king does not have a subordinate, and it is not that it does not. The subordinate does not rely on the king, and it is not that it does not.

/3.2.3.2.3.1.4.3. conclusion for all [doctrines]/ Each [doctrine] is like that. They are in perfect interfusion without obstruction (*yuanrong wuai* 圓融無礙). In this way, all the above doctrines follow one principle, not causing contradiction in the enigmatic purport (*bu shuang xuanzong* 不爽玄宗).

☐: *There is no* means that they are not identical (*bu ji* 不即), as the two characteristics are different. *It is not that there is not* means that they are not different (*bu li* 不離), as they do not have two essences. In addition, *there is no* means that they do not have two essences, and completely contain each other (*hu shejin* 互攝盡). *It is not that there is not* means [the individual characteristics] of the two are not destroyed, and their effects and function penetrate [each other] (*liyong jiaoche* 力用交徹).

⁵¹ Chengguan quotes Paramārtha’s version, though it is slightly different. See T 32, 1666: 579c14–c16. For Śikṣānanda’s version, see T 32, 1667: 588a13–a15. Hakeda’s translation: “Since the essential nature of corporeal form is identical with wisdom, the essence of corporeal form which has yet to be divided into tangible forms is called the ‘wisdom-body’. Since the essential nature of wisdom is identical with corporeal form, [the essence of corporeal form which has yet to be divided into tangible forms] is called Dharmakaya pervading everywhere.” See Hakeda (1967, p. 72).

⁵² This passage is found in the sixteenth chapter of the 80-fascicle *Huayanjing*. See T 10, 279: 89a2–3. For the English translation, see Cleary (1993, p. 403).

/3.2.3.2.3.2. *explanation of profundity using positive statements/ Its profundity can be revealed through a reliance on positive statements* means that the mind [of *Tathāgata*] cannot be known by wisdom, but can be praised through a reliance on wisdom, as wisdom is an associate of the mind. Moreover, [the *Sūtra*] elucidates its enigmatic [feature] with ten metaphors.⁵³ The mind which is a support enigmatic and enigmatic again (*xuan you xuan* 玄又玄).⁵⁴ That is the reason why at the end of all the ten metaphors it concludes that it is a characteristic of the mind.

/3.2.4. *a humble conclusion/* If even Buddha did not speak about it, how would an ordinary person dare to think that he is endowed with the appropriate conditions? Thus relying on the principles of teachings I showed the enigmatic purport. I hope I did not make the mistake of being too complicated.

☐: *If even Buddha did not speak about it* means that the *Sūtra* says: THE MIND, THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF [*TATHĀGATA*] CANNOT BE GRASPED. This is to say that it cannot be described. Śākyamuni shut himself in a room of Magadha [for meditation].⁵⁵ Vimalakīrti closed his mouth in Vaiśālī.⁵⁶ In all cases Buddha did not speak about it. The ocean of fruition is ineffable. It is associated only with enlightenment (*wei zheng xiangying* 唯證相應); thus it cannot be spoken about. The *appropriate conditions* are the conditions of the four *siddhāntas* (*sixitan* 四悉檀)⁵⁷ when the speech of that which cannot be spoken about (*wushuozhi shuo* 無說之說) is received.

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⁵³ Here Chengguan refers to the ten metaphors that the *sūtra* discusses after the passage now being studied.

⁵⁴ The expression “enigmatic and enigmatic again” is adopted from the first chapter of the *Daode jing*.

⁵⁵ This refers to the 21 days after Buddha became enlightened while he did not teach but was absorbed in deep meditation. See Nakamura (1975, p. 111).

⁵⁶ In the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra* Mañjuśrī asks Vimalakīrti to express his understanding on the nonduality of *dharma*s, but he remains silent. See T 14, 475: 551c23–24; Luk (1972, p. 100). For the translation of the Tibetan version, see Lamotte (1962, p. 318) and Thurman (1976, p. 77).

⁵⁷ *Siddhānta* is point of view or method of teaching. The four *siddhāntas* are: the worldly point of view (*laukika siddhānta*, *shijie xitan* 世界悉檀), the individual point of view (*prātipauru-sika siddhānta*, *gege weiren xitan* 各各為人悉檀), the therapeutic point of view (*prātipākṣika siddhānta*, *duizhi xitan* 對治悉檀), the supreme point of view (*pāramārthika siddhānta*, *diyī yī xitan* 第一義悉檀). See Swanson (1989, pp. 23–30).

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